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8 Postgenomic Darwinism
JOHN DUPRE´
Introduction
I might perhaps have better called this chapter post-Darwinian geno-
mics. One point I want to make is that it is time we disconnected our
discussions of evolution from an unhealthily close connection with the
name of Charles Darwin. Darwin, after all, wrote his most famous work
150 years ago, and rapidly advancing sciences do not generally rest
directly on work a century and a half old. Darwin knew nothing of
genetics or genomics and, as I shall especially emphasise, there have also
been remarkable advances in microbiology that he could not have known
about and that fundamentally affect our understanding of evolution.
I do not, of course, have any wish to deny Darwin’s greatness as a
scientist. It is impossible to read his extensive scientific writings without
being struck by the powers of his observation, the encyclopaedic breadth
of his knowledge, and a remarkable ability to move between detailed
observation and the grand sweep of theory. Moreover, the fact that it
was Darwin who convinced the learned world of the fact of evolution,
of the common descent of humans and other forms of life, gives him an
uncontestable place in the history of ideas. This has provided a corner-
stone of the naturalistic world view which, if hardly the universal
perspective of the human race, has increasingly become the dominant
perspective among its most educated and reflective minorities.
But this is not just a quibble about an anomalous degree of deference
to a distinguished and influential dead scientist. I think this deference
can act as an obstacle to the advance of the science. At its most extreme –
and here one cannot help seeing an ironic defeat for biology in its debate
with religious creationists – Darwin takes on the role of scriptural
150
Comp. by: PG1812 Stage : Proof ChapterID: 9780521131957c08 Date:8/2/10
Time:13:49:49 Filepath:h:/01_CUP/3B2/Brown_Fabian-9780521131957/Applications/3B2/
Proof/9780521131957c08.3d
authority, and his words are subject to detailed exegetical analysis as if
this was a way to better understand the biological world. It sometimes
seems that Darwin, like God in war, appears on both sides of most major
biological debates. One of the great epistemic virtues of science is that it
constantly attempts to revise itself and advance its understanding as new
information or insight accumulates. Excessive deference or even rever-
ence for past authorities is the antithesis of this epistemic commitment.
But more subtle and specific misunderstandings are also associated
with the excessive reverence for Darwin. It is sometimes forgotten that
whereas Darwin quite rapidly convinced the learned world of the truth
of evolution, the transformation between distinct species, after the publi-
cation of the Origin of Species, conviction for the process commemorated
in his subtitle, natural selection, was not achieved widely until well into
the twentieth century, with the synthesis of Darwinian natural selection
with Mendelian genetics. The real target of this chapter is not so much
with Darwin’s own views, but with the view that emerged at that time
as the ‘New Synthesis’, and has evolved today into what is often called
neo-Darwinism. There is a popular view that Darwin got just about
everything right that was possible for someone deprived of an adequate
understanding of genetics, and the New Synthesis filled in this final gap.
And it is this vision, lent weight by the towering authority of Charles
Darwin, which I suggest is becoming an obstacle to the advancement
of our understanding of evolution and its ability to take account of the
very remarkable advances in our biological understanding over the last
few decades.
Neo-Darwinism
By ‘neo-Darwinism’ I mean the New Synthesis as modified by the
emergence of molecular genetics in the 1950s and beyond. From the New
Synthesis it maintains (in addition to the core commitment to natural
selection) the Mendelian idea of inheritance as particulate, the concept
of genes that are transmitted to offspring in their entirety or not at all, and
the concept, following August Weismann, of a sharp division between
germ cells, which carry the transmitted genes, and somatic cells. Neo-
Darwinism can be defined, for my present purposes, in terms of two core
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theses and one important corollary. The first thesis is that overwhelm-
ingly the most important cause of the adaptation of organisms to their
environment, or conditions of life, is natural selection. This is the heart of
theDarwinism in neo-Darwinism. The second thesis is that inheritance, at
least as far as it is relevant to evolution, is exclusively mediated by nuclear
DNA. This thesis could be seen, if a little simplistically, as a blend of
Mendel and Weismann seen through the lens of Crick and Watson.
The corollary, especially stemming from the Weismannian ingredient
of the second thesis, is the rejection of Lamarckism. Lamarckism here has
perhaps less to do with the actual opinions of Jean-Baptiste Pierre
Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de la Marck even than do contemporary
understandings of Darwinism with the ideas of Charles Darwin.
Lamarckism now has come to mean the inheritance, or bequeathal to
descendants, of somatic characteristics acquired in the lifetime of an
organism, and this has become the ultimate taboo in Darwinian theory.
The significance of the taboo is that it presents a powerful restriction on
the variations that can be the targets of natural selection, the differences
between which Nature selects. These differences are now assumed to be,
or to be direct causal consequences of, randomly generated changes in
the genes or genome of the organism.
In the following pages I shall describe some developments in recent
biology that show that neo-Darwinism, if not entirely obsolete, is at least
severely limited in its ability to encompass the full range of evolutionary
processes. My suggestion is that the association with a long-dead hero
can convey the message that in general outline the problems around
evolution have been solved long ago, and only the details, perhaps of
evolutionary history, need to be sorted out. This message is sometimes
explicitly promoted in opposition, particularly in the United States, to
the powerful voices of creationists opposed to the very idea of evolution.
As I have already suggested, the response is surely a counterproductive
one. We should celebrate the fact that the exploration of evolution is an
exciting scientific project and, far from being essentially complete, it is
one of which we are still only at the very early stages. Those who insist
on having the whole ‘truth’ whether or not we have any serious grounds
for believing it are perhaps closer to the religious fundamentalists they
so vehemently oppose than they would like to believe. At any rate, what
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I shall do in the main body of this essay is look at some areas of biological
research that are radically altering our views of evolution and challen-
ging neo-Darwinian orthodoxy. As should by now be clear, I take this as
illustration of the excitement and dynamism of evolutionary science,
certainly not any indication of its vulnerability.
Revisionist Darwinism 1: the tree of life
The first topic I want to address that will indicate the shakiness of the
neo-Darwinian orthodoxy is the concept of the tree of life. The tree of life
is the standard neo-Darwinian representation of the relatedness of
organisms. As a tree, crucially, it constantly branches, and branches
always diverge, never merge. Species are represented as small twigs;
larger branches represent larger groups of organisms. By following
down from the branches towards the trunk of the tree it is possible in
principle to work backwards through all the ancestors of a group of
organisms to the earliest beginnings of life at the tree’s base. Darwin’s
imprimatur for this divergent evolutionary structure is often secured by
a picture in the notebooks that seems to represent a divergently branch-
ing structure, accompanied, to the delight of philosophical commenta-
tors, by the legend ‘I think’ (Figure 8.1). More significant still, though, is
the sole illustration in the Origin of Species representing with a branching
diagram the formation of new species through the divergence of varieties
within a species, an illustration that follows a chapter adumbrating the
benefits of divergence by analogy with the division of labour (Figure 8.2).
But this image of the tree of life has been rendered at least partially
obsolete by recent developments, especially in microbiology, where
so-called lateral gene transfer, the passage of genetic material not from
ancestors, but from sometimes distantly related organisms on widely
separated branches of the tree of life, is common. One reason for the
importance of this phenomenon is that it threatens to undermine the
pattern of explanation of features of biological organisms that is univer-
sally mandated by the divergently branching structure of the tree.
Neo-Darwinism, it will be recalled, attributes the adaptation of organ-
isms to natural selection, working on variations in the genetic material.
These variations are generated endogenously and transmitted within the
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narrow confines of the species, understood as groups of organisms
sharing access to the same gene pool. Embedding this idea within the
wider frame of the tree of life, we can see that the explanations for all the
characteristics of an organism are to be sought in the sequence of
ancestors traceable down the branches of the tree, and in the evolution-
ary process, namely natural selection, to which these ancestors had been
subject. Explanation of the characteristics of an organism by lateral gene
transfer, on the other hand, puts no limit in principle on where in the
history of life a particular aspect of a lineage may have originated. This is
F IGURE 8 . 1 Darwin’s first sketch of an evolutionary tree from
Notebook [B], the first notebook on Transmutation of Species (1837). Reproduced by
kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library.
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immediately obvious when we note that if lateral gene transfer is
common, the overall structure of relations between organisms will take
the form not of a tree, but of a web, or net. And in a web, unlike a tree,
there are many paths from one point to another.
Lateral gene transfer is widely recognised to be endemic among
microbial life forms (see, for example, Doolittle, 1999). Microbes transfer
bits of DNA from one to another by a process sometimes likened to sex
called conjugation, in which a tube down which the genetic unit passes is
inserted by one cell into another; by transformation, the uptake of free
DNA from the environment; and by transduction, in which the transfer is
mediated by viruses. These processes can result in genetic transfers
between the most distantly related organisms, even organisms from
different domains, the threefold classification now taken to be the most
fundamental division of living organisms.1 This, in short, removes the
presupposition that the evolutionary exigencies of linear ancestors explain
F IGURE 8 . 2 The sole illustration fromThe Origin of Species, showing the
divergence of ancestral species, first into varieties and eventually species. SpeciesG andH, for
instance, have gone extinct, whereas species I eventually gives rise to six descendant
species. Reproduced by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library.
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the features of their living descendants. Lateral gene transfer allows
features to have come from, more or less, anywhere in the biosphere.
Questioning the tree of life remains, none the less, a controversial
business.2 Although many microbiologists have accepted that there is no
unique tree for microbes, some still resist this conclusion, and insist
that there is a core genome, resistant to lateral transfer, and in terms
of which a microbial phylogenetic tree can be reconstructed (Lawrence
and Hendrickson, 2005; but see Charlebois and Doolittle, 2004). There
are serious problems with this, however. First we might wonder, even if
the claim can be sustained in some sense, whether the tree based on the
core genome is very useful. Or in other words, what is the tree of life for?
If, as I have been suggesting, its function is to underpin evolutionary
explanations of organismic features, then the more prevalent is lateral
transfer, the less will any tree be able to serve this end. This is even more
so as the genes that are likely to form the constant core will inevitably be
ones with fundamental, and therefore substantially invariant, functions
across a very wide range of organisms. They will, for that reason, be the
least useful in tracking differences between organisms. This leads natur-
ally to the question, why track phylogeny using these genes rather than
some others. Because of lateral transfer not all trees of genes will
coincide. And it may be that different gene trees will be useful for
answering different questions. Perhaps the defenders of the core genome
have in mind that what they should attempt to construct is the cell tree,
the tree that traces the sequence of (vertical) cell divisions back to the
beginning of cellular life. The trouble then is that this seems just to
assume what is at issue, that vertical inheritance is what really matters.
If this position is to be maintained regardless how much the contents of
the cells may be changed by other interacting, non-vertical processes,
one might wonder in the end whether it would end up as little more than
a fetishism of the cell membrane.
Eukaryote3 biologists are generally much more confident of the tree of
life, and with good reason.4 Lateral gene transfer seems less common
among eukaryotes, and there is little question that the tracing of vertical
ancestral relations is a powerful and useful way of classifying these
organisms.5 Even here, though, there is reason to be cautious. For a
start, hybridisation seems to be much more common than was once
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thought (Mallet, 2008). But perhaps more important, the transfer of
genetic elements by viruses certainly does continue in eukaryotes, and
may well prove to be an important factor in evolution. About half of the
human genome, for instance, consists of material that is thought to have
originated in transfers from viruses. Much of this, it is true, consists of
highly repetitive sequences that have seemed unlikely to be functionally
significant. When the idea of ‘junk DNA’ was fashionable, these were
prime candidates for junk. However, it now appears that at least 70%
of the genome is transcribed into RNA, and investigation of the roles of
various kinds of RNA fragment in regulating the genome is one of the
fastest growing fields in molecular biology. It would be premature to
assume that sequences of viral origin may not play crucial roles in such
regulatory systems. And finally, there are examples of significant func-
tional features of cells that do appear to involve protein-coding
sequences of viral origin. The best example here is of the evolution of
placental mammals. The tissue that provides the barrier between fetal
and maternal circulations, the syncytium, is believed to be coded for by
genes of viral origin (Mallet et al., 2004). There may surely be other
equally significant cases. It is at any rate clear that, even among eukary-
otes, lateral origins play some role in explaining the current features of
organisms. The always branching, never merging, tree of traditional
phylogeny is not enough.
Revisionist Darwinism 2: evolution by merger
Lateral gene transfer can be seen in a rather different light as an example
of something much broader, evolution by merger. This gets to one
of the most general points I want to make about the limitations of
neo-Darwinism. The first thesis mentioned above, the overwhelming
emphasis on natural selection, has encouraged neo-Darwinian evolution-
ists to think a great deal about competition, but very little about cooper-
ation. Indeed, the latter appears mainly in the guise of a problem – the
‘problem of altruism’. The problem of altruism is, crudely put, the
problem of understanding why it is that, in a ‘Darwinian’ world in which
the only survivors are the most ruthless and self-interested competitors,
some organisms are actually nice to one another. But looked at from
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a quite different perspective, life is a massively cooperative enterprise and
‘altruism’ should hardly be surprising. The elements in a cell or the cells
in a multicellular organism must obviously work in a highly coordinated
way and subordinate their own ‘interests’ to those of the whole of which
they are part. It will be objected at once that this is cooperation within
an organism, not between organisms, and so of course not a problem.
But this reply assumes that we know exactly what constitutes an
organism and what is merely a part of an organism, an assumption
I shall suggest is highly problematic.
It is perhaps hardly controversial to note that natural selection will
frequently select the organisms that are best at cooperating with the
organisms with which they interact. This is just one way of adapting to
the environment, the most salient part of which is typically the other
organisms that inhabit it. I want to go a step beyond this, however, and
suggest that merger with other organisms (or suborganismic biological
entities) is a central process by which biological organisms evolve. Such a
process is referred to as endosymbiosis, and is most widely familiar from
the ideas of Lynn Margulis (1970) about the origins of the eukaryotic
cell.6 It is now universally acknowledged that the mitochondria that
provide the energy source for all eukaryotic cells, and the chloroplasts
that effect photosynthesis in plants, were both originally free-living
organisms but are now more or less independently reproducing but
wholly dependent constituents of larger cells. Although the details are
much more controversial, it is also believed by many that the eukaryotic
cell itself derived from a merger between two prokaryotes, perhaps
a bacterium and an archaeon.
The examples just mentioned are instances of fully obligate endosym-
biosis: mitochondria are parts of eukaryotic cells, and there is no more
question of why they are acting altruistically towards the containing cell
than of why my liver acts altruistically towards me. However, it is
important to note that endosymbiosis is something that may evolve over
a long period of time, and in the mean time may consist of a range of
degrees of interdependence from conditional and reciprocal cooperation
to full endosymbiosis. There are, for example, well studied cases of
varying degrees of endosymbiosis between insects and bacteria.
Buchnera aphidicola, endosymbionts of aphids, have been associated with
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their partners for up to 200 million years, and have lost the ability to
carry out various essential metabolic functions on their own. Wolbachia,
on the other hand, a genus of bacteria associated with a very wide range
of arthropod species including perhaps half of all insect species, is
generally referred to as a parasite. Wolbachia are particularly interesting
for their ability to control the reproductive behaviour of their hosts.
Some can kill or feminize males, or induce parthenogenesis. They can
also induce reproductive incompatibility between insects infected with
different Wolbachia strains, possibly playing a determinant role in
speciation.
It is generally supposed that the manipulation by Wolbachia of their
hosts’ reproduction contributes to their own rather than their hosts’
reproductive interest. However, as some host species appear unable to
reproduce without the assistance of Wolbachia, and as Wolbachia are
obligatorily symbiotic, it is not always clear how these interests are to
be separated. Wolbachia are involved in transfers of DNA between insect
species, raising questions about genetic differentiation of insect species
(Whitworth et al., 2007), and a whole Wolbachia genome has been found
embedded within a Drosophila genome (Dunning Hotopp et al., 2007).
It has also been found that Wolbachia may reduce the vulnerability of
their hosts to viral infections (Texeira et al., 2008). It would be difficult
to assess the ratio of costs and benefits to the parties in these intimate
associations, but it seems likely that this balance will vary from case to
case, and that in some cases the relationship has moved to full mutualism
or even symbiosis.
One reason I have spent a little time on this example is that it begins
to introduce a fundamental question, namely how we determine the
limits of an organism. No one doubts that mitochondria are parts of
the organisms in which they are found whereas, on the whole, everyone
takes Wolbachia and their insect hosts to be distinct organisms. But what
is the basis of this different treatment? It will be recalled that discussions
of altruism tend to assume that this question is unproblematic. If, as
I shall suggest, it is a thoroughly indeterminate matter, settled as much
by our interests as investigators as by anything in Nature, it will clearly
be necessary to rethink the question of altruism or, more broadly,
competition and cooperation.
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What is an organism?7
Although philosophers have for many years questioned some of the key
concepts of biology, such as the species or, more recently, the gene, on the
whole they have not seen much to worry about with the concept of an
organism. According to the orthodox view, there are two kinds of organ-
isms: single-celled, or microbes, and multicellular, or (as I have elsewhere
suggested we call them (O’Malley and Dupre´, 2005)) macrobes.8 In the
former case the cell is the organism. In the latter case all the cells derived
from a fertilised egg, or zygote, constitute the one organism. We might
summarise the view as ‘one organism, one genome’. This concept of the
organism could be seen as the microlevel reflection of the macroscopic tree
of life: both within and between organisms we find orderly and always
divergent branching. But we might also want to approach the question of
what constitutes an organism from a functional perspective: what are the
systems of cells that interact with the surrounding environment as organ-
ised and generally cooperative wholes? From this starting point we would
note that microbes do not typically function as isolated individuals but
rather in complex associations often composed of highly diverse kinds of
cells. Typical of such associations are biofilms, the generally slimy coatings
that develop on practically any moist surface. Consider, for instance, one
well studied class of biofilms, those on the surfaces of our teeth known as
dental plaque. Over 500 different bacterial taxa have been found living in
the human mouth (Kolenbrander, 2000) and, according to one authority,
‘Oral bacteria in plaque do not exist as independent entities but function
as a coordinated, spatially organized and fully metabolically integrated
microbial community, the properties of which are greater than the sum
of the component species’ (Marsh, 2004). Why would we not consider this
community, the organized functional whole, to constitute an organism?
If we concede that biofilms comprise a kind of multicellular organism,
then the argument is also over as far as traditional monogenomic
multicellular organisms are concerned. For all known such multicellular
wholes exist in symbiotic relations to often enormous and diverse com-
munities of microbes. In the human body, for instance, it is estimated that
90% of the total number of cells are in fact microbial (Savage, 1977),
living mainly in our gut, but also on the surface of the skin and in all the
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bodily orifices. These microbes contain perhaps 100 times as many genes
as those found in the more traditional human genome (Xu and Gordon,
2003), which has led to the launch by the US National Institutes of
Health of the Human Microbiome Project, which will explore this
missing 99% of the full human genome. The importance attached to this
project reflects an increasing awareness that these symbiotic microbes
have a fundamental influence on human health. They are known to be
involved in digestive processes, and hypothesized to have a significant
role in causing obesity. For model organisms it has been demonstrated
that microbial symbionts are necessary for normal physiological devel-
opment (Bates et al., 2006), that they affect gene expression in the ‘host’
cells (Hooper et al., 2001), and that they are involved in the maturing
of the immune system (Umesaki and Setoyama, 2000).9 There is every
reason to expect similar findings in humans.
I propose then that the typical organism is a collection of cells of
different kinds, organised cooperatively to maintain its structure and
reproduce similar structures. As Maureen O’Malley and I have put it
(forthcoming), an organism is a metabolically integrated community of
lineage segments. It will immediately strike evolutionists that this con-
ceptually separates the organism (functional whole) from the evolving
entity (part of a lineage). But this, of course, is the point. The assimila-
tion of these concepts obscures the empirical reality that evolution
requires both (directly) reproducing lineages and the assembly of organ-
isms from components of these lineages, and that these are in principle
quite independent processes. While most of these lineage segments will
have little chance of reproducing themselves except in so far as they are
able to form parts of appropriate communities, this is nevertheless a
contingent matter.10 One consequence of this proposal is that what is an
organism, and whether something is part of an organism or not, are not
questions that necessarily admit of definitive answers. Whether a group
of microbes is a closely connected ecological community or an organism
may be a matter of biological judgement. The important point is that it,
or most of it, will share an evolutionary fate. If its constituent cells are
to send descendants off to participate in new biofilms it will be because
the parental biofilm is thriving. What I have been calling organisms are
units of selection, objects between which natural selection selects.
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Cooperation again
I can imagine a frustrated reader complaining that I have yet to address
the kind of cooperation that is of real interest to evolutionary biology,
cooperation between conspecifics. Cooperation with other organisms is
just adaptation to the environment, of which they are part. Some of them
are to be eaten, most can be ignored, others are more useful as collabor-
ators, and so on. Conspecifics, on the other hand, are always competitors
for representation by their descendants in subsequent generations. So let
me say something about this topic.
The orthodox neo-Darwinian view is that the only circumstance that
brings about cooperation between conspecifics is kin selection. Here it is
time to distinguish between some degrees of cooperation. If two lions
can kill a wildebeest that neither could handle alone, and moreover it will
provide plenty of food for both, they will do well to cooperate. Evolution-
ists tend rather to speak of ‘altruism’ in a technical sense according to
which an act is altruistic only if it not only confers a benefit on the
recipient but is also more costly to the donor than refraining from action.
Any animal that acted in this way would lose out to natural selection in
competition with others that avoided such acts of kindness. The only
exception would be the case where the beneficiary is kin, perhaps one’s
offspring, as described by so-called inclusive fitness theory. Here the
fundamental principle is said to be Hamilton’s rule: rB > C. B is the
benefit to the recipient, C the cost to the donor and r the so-called
coefficient of relatedness. This coefficient is ½ for offspring or full siblings
in sexual species, and is thought of as the proportion of genes that two
organisms share by virtue of their relations of descent.11 If rB > C, for
example if I make a sacrifice that provides more than double the benefit to
my child, evolution will favour such behaviour. I don’t want to deny that
this is a powerful tool for analysing important aspects of evolutionary
processes and their potential stability or instability. One very impressive
example is its application to theoretical discussions of the evolution of
eusociality, the often vast and complexly articulated social system charac-
teristic of many ants, wasps and bees (Hymenoptera), termites and, alone
among mammals, the naked mole rat. These arguments have shown that
only under conditions of strict monogamy for an exclusive breeding couple
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is such a social arrangement likely to evolve. Recent work (Hughes et al.,
2008) has confirmed that such strict monogamy was indeed the ancestral
condition in a large number of Hymenoptera species studied, giving
convincing support to inclusive fitness theory.
I want to make two somewhat more sceptical comments on this topic,
however. First, it is often said that altruism outside the narrow confines
of kin selection theory will be subverted by competition from less
altruistic rivals. The assumption that there are indeed such rivals seems
sometimes to be a matter of pure dogma. Consider, for instance, an
example that seems to contradict standard kin selection theory, also
from the Hymenoptera. The Argentine ant (Linepithema humile), while
known for its inter-colony aggression in its native land, has now taken to
behaving in a non-aggressive, cooperative way with relation to other
colonies of conspecifics, in a range of newly colonized areas in Europe,
North America, Japan and Australia. Contrary to a speculation that this
must be due to genetic relatedness between the recently landed colonists,
colonies in the European case, at least, were found to be genetically
diverse. There is considerable dispute about how to explain or even
describe this phenomenon, though one thing that seems to be widely
agreed is that the ants as a whole do very well out of the arrangement.
As humans have also discovered, warfare may benefit a few, but it is
hardly good for the species. Unsurprisingly, it is also speculated that the
arrangement will be unstable. A mutant aggressive colony would per-
haps do extremely well cutting a swathe through its amiable neighbours.
But even if this could happen, it doesn’t imply that it must. Perhaps
eventually the system will collapse, and perhaps it is bound to do so in
the very long run. But, to paraphrase Keynes, in the long run we are
all extinct. The existence of cooperation between non-kin is sufficient
to show that there are evolutionary processes capable of creating it.
The most widely discussed such process is of course group selection,
though this does remain controversial, if less so after the extremely
influential work of Sober and Wilson (1998). Even if it is demonstrated
that there are circumstances that would undermine these cooperative
systems, this hardly shows that they could not, after all, have come into
being in the first place. It is a contingent matter how long more or less
cooperative, even altruistic, systems last.
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This brings me conveniently to my second point, the one that has been
the main focus of this paper. It is that arguments about what entities can
be expected to cooperate or compete with what others presuppose that
we know what the individuals are that are cooperating or competing.
Group selection is taken to be problematic because it is assumed that the
members of the group are real, robust, indisputable individuals, whereas
we see the group itself as a fragile coalition, a thoroughly dubious
individual. But what I have been suggesting is that in fact there is no
sharp line between the group of more or less cooperative individuals on
the one hand, and the unified self-contained individual on the other.
Indeed, it may well be that there is a tendency for the former to evolve
into the latter, and that in the course of this process the individuals will
act increasingly as parts subordinate to a larger whole. Presumably
something like this must have happened in the evolution of multicellu-
larity, and indeed is thought to have happened many times (Buss, 1987).
There is even a bigger picture here. The idea that life is hierarchically
structured is an ancient and obvious one. Molecules comprise cells; cells
make organs and organ systems; organisms are composed of organs and
the like; and organisms in turn make up larger social or ecological units.
This is a useful picture in focusing the investigating mind on particular
aspects of the biological world, but it can easily be taken too literally.
Cells, organs, and even organisms are, in Nature, embedded in larger
systems, and their separate existence requires either a scalpel or a
process of abstraction. Two further points reinforce both the significance
and the plausibility of this observation. First, or so I would also argue, a
full understanding of a biological entity at any of these intermediate
levels is impossible without taking account both of its composition from
smaller constituents, and the influences exerted on it by the larger
system of which it is part, though that is an argument beyond the scope
of the present paper (see Powell and Dupre´, 2009). Causal explanation
runs both from smaller to larger and from larger to smaller. Second, we
should recall that our hierarchy of entities is already itself an abstraction
from a hierarchy of processes. It may be that many forms of scientific
reasoning require descriptions of entities as if they had a set of static
properties definitive of such entities. But the reality, as best we under-
stand it, is of a series of nested processes at timescales ranging from
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nanoseconds for intercellular chemical reactions to hundreds of millions
of years for some macroevolutionary processes (Dupre´, 2008). The illu-
sion of an objectively distinct and unique hierarchy of objects is much
less compelling when this abstraction is borne in mind.
Lamarck redux
I turn now to the strictest taboo in neo-Darwinism, Lamarckism.12
Lamarckism, here, must be understood in an even less historically
grounded sense than Darwinism, and has little to do with the great
French naturalist. The taboo concerns the inheritance of characteristics
acquired during the lifetime of the organism. According to strict
neo-Darwinists only genetic mutations within the germline and the
recombination of genetic resources brought about by sexual reproduc-
tion provide the resources on which selection acts. Curiously, however,
though mention of Lamarckism can still bring a shudder to many evolu-
tionary biologists, almost no one still believes in the strict form of the
taboo. Or so, anyhow, I shall attempt to demonstrate.
The topic with which I began, lateral gene transfer, is one generally
acknowledged qualification of strict anti-Lamarckism. Genes transferred
laterally into the genome of an organism are certainly acquired, and may
certainly be inherited. The reason that Lamarckism is such a profound
potential challenge to traditional Darwinism is that somatic traits
acquired during the lifetime of the organism may often be adaptive,
constituting the organism’s response to the environment. An animal
may run as fast as it can to escape speedy predators or in pursuit of
fleet-footed prey, for example, and in doing so it may develop stronger
leg muscles. But the inheritance of such adaptive acquired characteristics
would threaten the first principle of neo-Darwinism, the monopoly of
natural selection in producing adaptation.13 Here it may be thought that
lateral gene transfer offers little threat of this kind. Perhaps we should see
it as no more than the equivalent of a very big mutation. But first, there
is a growing consensus that lateral gene transfer has been of fundamental
importance, at least in microbial evolution. Boucher and colleagues
(2003) review the evidence for its role in ‘photosynthesis, aerobic respir-
ation, nitrogen fixation, sulfate reduction, methylotrophy, isoprenoid
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biosynthesis, quorum sensing, flotation (gas vesicles), thermophily, and
halophily’. Moreover, second, a large number of researchers suggest that
lateral gene transfer is indeed often an adaptive response to the environ-
ment. According to Pal and colleagues (2005) ‘bacterial metabolic networks
evolve by direct uptake of peripheral reactions in response to changed
environments’. And ‘lateral gene transfer provides the bacterial genome
with a new set of genes that help it to explore and adapt to new ecological
niches’ (Marri et al., 2007). Note the similarity with the kind of cooperative
ventures I discussed earlier in this paper. Whole microbial cells (or indeed
macrobial cell systems) adapt to their environment by recruiting, or being
recruited by, coalitions of cooperating cells. More complex organisms may
recruit conspecifics or even members of other species to form social
collectives that enhance their ability to cope with environmental chal-
lenges. And, finally, cells may sometimes recruit adaptively useful genetic
fragments from their environments. All very Lamarckian.
One response to the issue of lateral gene transfer may be to downplay
the importance of microbial evolution. Perhaps microbes are really rather
insignificant little beasts? To this, however, it is sufficient to respond
that 80% of evolutionary history is a history solely of the evolution of
microbes; the vast majority of organisms alive today are microbes; and all
known macrobes are dependent for their existence on symbiotic relations
with microbes. As I have briefly mentioned above, the importance of
lateral gene transfer in macrobial evolution is itself a matter of active
debate. But anyhow, an account of evolution that doesn’t apply to
microbes is one that ignores the overwhelmingly dominant manifestation
of life on Earth.
Varieties of inheritance
The Lamarckian aspects of the topic just considered at least do not
violate the idea that the vast majority of inheritance passes through the
nuclear genome. Lateral gene transfer may be very important in evolu-
tion, but it is very rare by comparison to the routine passage of genetic
material from parents to offspring. However, there are other reasons
to recognize that the neo-Darwinian restriction of inheritance to trans-
mission of the nuclear genome provides a thoroughly impoverished
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picture.14 The most widely discussed form of inheritance that is excluded
is cultural inheritance. Much of this discussion is directed specifically to
human evolution (e.g. Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Although this work is
very important in many ways, including in showing the inadequacy
of the orthodox neo-Darwinian treatments of human evolution offered
by evolutionary psychologists, in the present essay I shan’t discuss
the special problems of human evolution. There is still heated debate
about whether human evolution raises unique issues, and every aspect of
human evolution has been discussed and debated by numerous authors,
including myself (Dupre´, 2001). In this essay I shall avoid these very
specific issues.
I mentioned in passing above the perspective of developmental
systems theory (DST) (see note 10). DST abandons the myopic focus
on the nuclear genome typical of much neo-Darwinism, and looks at the
entire cycle of events by which the organism is reproduced. The funda-
mental unit of analysis is the life cycle of the organism and, given this
unit of analysis, it should be clear from the preceding discussion that the
requisite concept of an organism must also be the multigenomic, multi-
lineage one advocated above. From a DST perspective a large body of
work on the cultural transmission of behaviour can be seen as fitting
fully into an evolutionary framework. Some fairly arbitrarily selected
recent examples are the learning of frog calls by bats (Page and Ryan,
2006), the use of sponges in foraging by bottle-nosed dolphins (Krutzen
et al., 2005), or, perhaps the best studied example, the transmission of
bird songs (Slater, 1986). The process of learning behaviour by immature
individuals, and the behaviour of mature individuals involved in mating
and in rearing offspring, are clearly crucial parts of the developmental
cycle, and potentially evolving aspects of the life cycle.
Less familiar, but perhaps even more important, is the fact that far from
the idea occasionally suggested in popularisations of neo-Darwinism
(e.g. Dawkins, 1976) that the genome is the only significant material thing
transmitted in reproduction, the minimal material contribution in any
form of reproduction is an entire maternal cell. This is an extremely
complex object with a great deal of internal structure and a bewildering
variety of chemical constituents. For asexual organisms (most organisms,
that is), it seems perverse to think of anything other than the cell as the
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basic unit of inheritance. For sexual organisms the issue is more complex,
because each individual begins life with a new, generally unprecedented,
inheritance, at least genetically. But of course there is a vast number
of other materials that are passed on with the maternal cell (and a few
even with the paternal sperm) that form a major part of the (inherited)
developmental system.
It is sometimes supposed that all the non-DNA material passed on in
reproduction is unimportant because it is the DNA that carries the
inherited differences on which natural selection can act. But this seems
to be a dogmatic assertion rather than anything for which there is
empirical evidence. Why, for example, might not changes in the chemis-
try of the cell membrane be inherited in the process of cell division?
But we do not need to speculate. There is a rapidly developing field
of biological research, epigenetics, which may be seen as answering a
fundamental question, but one that can seem mysterious from the radic-
ally DNA-centred perspective – why do different cells with the same
genome do different things? Why do my liver cells differ so radically
from my brain cells, for instance? Central to epigenetic research is the
understanding of how other chemicals in the cell act on the genome to
determine which parts of it are expressed (i.e. transcribed to RNA and
(sometimes) translated to a protein).
Epigenetics is important in part for breaking the hold of the so-called
‘central dogma’ of molecular genetics, that causality, and hence infor-
mation, runs only in one direction, from DNA to RNA to protein.15
Epigenetics could be described, with a little hyperbole, as the study of
the falsity of the central dogma. But, secondarily and consequently, it
reveals the potential diversity of inheritance at the molecular level. In the
first place, once it is seen that the surrounding cell acts on the genome,
not merely the other way around, it is clear that the inter-generational
transmission of any part of the cellular system may embody significant
heredity. Second, one of the crucial ways in which epigenetic effects
on the DNA occur is through actual modifications to the structure
of the DNA chain. The best studied of these is methylation, in which a
methyl group is attached to one of the bases, cytosine, that comprise
the DNA sequence. This has the effect of inhibiting the transcription
of the sequence of which the methylated cytosine molecule is part. It is
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an obvious possibility that these modifications could be inherited.
The claim that they are indeed inherited has been highly controversial.
In part this was because it had been understood that a process of
demethylation took place during meiosis, the formation of sex cells.
If this demethylation was total, then the epigenetic changes would not
be transmitted. Recently, it has become increasingly widely agreed that
demethylation is not complete, and hence that methylation is to some
degree inherited (Chong and Whitelaw, 2004). This has been a remark-
ably heated controversy, and it is impossible to avoid the suspicion that
this is in significant part because if methylation patterns, something that
can be acquired in the lifetime of an organism, can be inherited, this will
raise the possibility of violating the taboo against Lamarckian inheritance.
It is very interesting to note that epigenetic changes might still be
inherited even if they had proved to be entirely erased at meiosis. This is
because when they are induced by external, environmental influences
they may also contribute to the production of those same influences.
The classic example substantiating this possibility derives from a series
of experiments on maternal care in rats, carried out by Michael Meaney
and colleagues. Grooming, especially licking, by mother rats appears to
be very important for the proper development of rat pups, and rats that
do not receive sufficient such maternal care grow up generally fearful
and, most significantly, less disposed to provide high quality maternal
care to their offspring (Weaver et al., 2004; Meaney et al., 2007). It has
been demonstrated that these effects are mediated by maternal grooming
causing changes of methylation within cells in the brain, which in turn
affect the production of neurotransmitters. Thus, the trait of high quality
maternal care appears to be transmitted through the induction of meth-
ylation patterns in young female rats through exposure to such maternal
care. This might also be seen as an adaptive and heritable epigenetic
switch: in a stressful and dangerous environment, perhaps, it is best to be
fearful (even the paranoid can be right) and too risky to devote more than
the minimum effort to caring for the young. It is, of course, possible, and
a possibility that might be very widely significant, that this modestly
Lamarckian mechanism could be an adaptation acquired by Darwinian
means. As mentioned above, inheritance mechanisms are among the
more interesting features of organisms that evolve.
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Conclusion
I conclude very much as I began. With absolutely no disrespect to
Darwin, biological insights gained over the last few decades have
profoundly altered the way we can and should think about evolution.
It appears that evolutionary processes may be more diverse than we had
imagined, including Lamarckian mechanisms as well as neo-Darwinian,
cooperative and symbiotic as well as competitive and individualistic.16
The evolutionary histories of the entities that make up biological wholes
may also be multiple. Genomes have different histories from the organ-
isms in which they reside, both because they assimilate material from
other sources, and because they have their own history within the
organism – for example, of intragenomic duplications. And organisms,
at least when understood as the functional wholes that interact with the
rest of the world, are coalitions of entities with diverse evolutionary
histories. Neo-Darwinism has much to say about the divergent processes
that push biological entities apart, much less about the convergent
processes in which the whole is constantly more than the sum of the parts.
None of this should be remotely shocking. But for some reason or
reasons we have buffered an outdated view of evolution with a thicket of
surrounding dogma and presumption that stands in the way of advan-
cing the theory in line with the stunning insights that are being gained
in other parts of biology. Part of this story surely is that this dogma has
developed as an unintended response to competition with thoroughly
anti-scientific perspectives (creationism, ‘intelligent design’) that have
somehow positioned themselves as rivals to scientific evolutionism. And
I suspect the links with creationist views may be more complex than
that. Extreme neo-Darwinists sometimes share with creationists the
yearning for an all-encompassing scheme, a single explanatory frame-
work that makes sense of life.17 One thinks, for instance of Daniel
Dennett’s (1995) paean of praise for natural selection, which he then
deploys as the essential resource to explain everything from the
breeding behaviour of bees to the deliberative processes of the human
mind. But evolution is a mosaic of more or less related processes,
producing a motley collection of outcomes. Just because one has a
hammer, one should be careful not to suppose that everything is a nail.
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If one of the things that needs to be done to remedy this partial
paralysis of our evolutionary thinking is that we detach our view of
evolution a little from our reverence for Charles Darwin, then I am
sure he won’t mind.
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